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Family Ownership, Board Independence, and R&D Investment
Hsiang-Lan Chen, Ph.D.*
and
Wen-Tsung Hsu
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: angelachen{at}ccms.nkfust.edu.tw.
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Abstract |
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Family influence is central in Asian countries; however, little research exists regarding the effects of family ownership and corporate governance on corporate investment decisions. This article examines the relationships among family ownership, board independence, and R&D investment using a sampling of Taiwanese firms. The finding of the negative family ownership–R&D investment relationship suggests that family ownership may discourage risky long-term R&D investment. Such a finding may also suggest that firms with high family ownership may use R&D investment more efficiently and thus need less R&D in relation to firms with low family ownership. In addition, the interaction of family ownership and CEO duality/independent director ratio is negatively/positively related to R&D investment, suggesting that firms with high family ownership may increase R&D investment when the CEO–chair roles are separated or when more independent outsiders are included in the board.
First published on September 11, 2009, doi:10.1177/0894486509341062
Family Business Review 2009;22:347.
A more recent version of this article appeared on December 1, 2009

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